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Article
Introduction
Democracy is founded on freedom of public opinion (Manin, 
1997), and for opinions to be freely formed, citizens need 
diverse but reliable sources of information (Dahl, 1998). At 
the same time, the likelihood that individuals encounter 
diverse and reliable viewpoints depends on their informa-
tional environments (Prior, 2007). Whereas research suggests 
that the mass media are more likely to expose individuals to 
diverse information in comparison with face-to-face discus-
sions, scholars have debated whether digital media, because 
of their choice-enhancing affordances, are more conducive to 
self-segregation. In this article, we investigate the role of 
social media in exposing individuals to different viewpoints 
on the basis of unique representative online surveys of Twitter 
users who posted campaign-related messages during the gen-
eral elections of 2013 in Germany and Italy.
We demonstrate that the Twitter users we sampled were 
more likely to employ social media to engage with networks 
that supported rather than challenged their views, but that 
disagreement persisted on social media even when homoph-
ily was the modal outcome. The more individuals exchanged 
election-related messages on social media, the more likely 
they were to be part of networks that supported their views. 
At the same time, the ideological composition of respon-
dents’ online networks closely reflected their face-to-face 
networks, so individuals encountering oppositional and 
mixed political viewpoints offline tended to have similar 
experiences on social media. We also show that, when online 
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Scholars have debated whether social media platforms, by allowing users to select the information to which they are 
exposed, may lead people to isolate themselves from viewpoints with which they disagree, thereby serving as political “echo 
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elections would engage with (a) supportive, (b) oppositional, and (c) mixed political networks. Based on online surveys of 
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and offline experiences with agreement or disagreement do 
not perfectly overlap, political networks on social media are 
more likely to add to, rather than detract from, the overall 
diversity of political viewpoints that individuals encounter.
Taken together, our findings suggest that political 
homophily on social media is not a universal outcome that all 
users experience to an equivalent degree. On the contrary, it 
is a condition that citizens experience with different degrees 
of intensity depending on their broader patterns of political 
conversation and their specific habits in the political use of 
social media. In particular, individuals experiencing homoph-
ily in their offline discussion networks, and those who are 
more engaged in the exchange of political messages on social 
media, are more likely than others to encounter echo cham-
bers on these platforms.
Antecedents to the Experience of 
Political Homophily on Social Media
In this study, we focus on two main themes: the extent to 
which social media foster exposure to political agreement or 
disagreement and the extent to which, and reasons why, indi-
viduals vary in their experience of political agreement and 
disagreement on social media. In particular, we assess 
whether social media users are prone to engage with three 
different types of political networks, as defined by Nir 
(2011): “supportive” networks, which primarily expose indi-
viduals to viewpoints with which they agree; “oppositional” 
networks that primarily confront members with viewpoints 
with which they disagree; and “mixed” networks that feature 
both congruent and divergent positions.1
Political Agreement and Disagreement on Social Media
In contemporary media environments, citizens acquire and 
integrate political information received through interpersonal 
communication, the mass media, and digital media. Prior 
research suggests that these channels are not equally likely to 
expose individuals to diverse viewpoints. Studies of interper-
sonal communication show that individuals gravitate toward 
others who share their viewpoints (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 
1995). This pattern has been understood within the rational 
choice paradigm as a strategy to acquire low-cost information 
from reliable sources (Downs, 1957) and within experimental 
social psychology as the result of individuals’ desire for belief 
confirmation (Festinger, 1957; Sears & Freedman, 1967). 
However, Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) demon-
strate that disagreement still persists, especially in low-den-
sity networks in which individuals interact with “weak ties,” 
that is, relatively distant acquaintances who are more likely to 
differ from them, in comparison with close interaction part-
ners. Huckfeldt et al. (2004, pp. 21-23) also note that indi-
viduals choose with whom they talk not only on the basis of 
political homogeneity but also in terms of commonalities in 
lifestyles, hobbies, and family life.
The literature on selective exposure highlights that indi-
viduals, if given the opportunity, tend to choose media con-
tent that matches their political preferences (Garrett, 2009; 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944) and that the mass 
media provide more exposure to contradictory viewpoints 
when compared with interpersonal conversations (Mutz & 
Martin, 2001). However, Iyengar and Hahn (2009) have 
shown that, in a high-choice media environment, citizens 
can craft personalized news diets that are consistent with 
their political views.
With respect to digital media, three different lines of 
research can be identified within the literature: (a) studies 
showing how the affordances of the Internet, by enhancing 
opportunities for the selection of sources, facilitate ideologi-
cal self-segregation; (b) studies showing this type of selec-
tivity, while resulting in increased exposure to consonant 
contents, does not necessarily lead to avoidance of dissonant 
ones; and (c) studies contending that inadvertent exposure to 
political content on the web might act as a counter-balancing 
mechanism increasing exposure to political disagreement.
The first strand of research emphasizes that the Internet’s 
selective nature—the fact that it allows, and to some degree 
compels, users to make frequent choices among a variety of 
sources and content (Bimber & Davis, 2003)—leads most 
individuals to engage primarily with views similar to their 
own. The general argument is that the Internet functions as 
an “echo chamber” in which individuals are exposed more 
or less exclusively to consonant views, and it is supported 
by some empirical research. Gaines and Mondak (2009) 
found that students in a large American university clustered 
on Facebook according to their ideological proclivities. 
Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic (2015) studied 10 million 
Facebook users in the United States who declared their 
ideological preferences and showed that—even taking into 
account the fact that Facebook’s algorithmic ranking of 
news according to users’ preferences limits the diversity of 
content they are exposed to—individuals are more likely to 
engage with stories that are consistent with their viewpoints. 
Studies analyzing large quantities of behavioral data like-
wise suggest that political networks on Twitter exhibit high 
levels of homophily (Barberá, 2015; Colleoni, Rozza, & 
Arvidsson, 2014; Conover et al., 2011). At the same time, 
Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, and Bonneau (2015) observed 
that the degree of homophily in information sharing on 
Twitter varied to a considerable extent according to users’ 
ideology, context, and issue type.
The second group of studies suggests that the choice 
affordances of digital media are less likely to produce self-
segregation, such as the filtering out of dissonant viewpoints, 
in comparison with traditional forms of media. Based on 
extensive research, Holbert, Garrett, and Gleason concluded 
that the extent to which people deliberately avoid attitude-
discrepant information online had been exaggerated by 
previous research. To the contrary, they argue, “individuals 
exhibit a stronger bias toward attitude-consistent information 
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than against attitude-discrepant information” (Holbert, 
Garrett, & Gleason, 2010, p. 19). In other words, political 
interactions on digital media may entail increased exposure 
to viewpoints users agree with, but not necessarily an equiv-
alent avoidance of contrary ideas, and thus do not necessarily 
result in self-segregation.
Finally, according to the third line of research, even 
if individuals select online content and sources based on 
their political inclinations, digital media also facilitate 
exposure to different viewpoints, perhaps inadvertently. 
Given that individuals are more likely to come across atti-
tude-discordant political content (often unintentionally) in 
non-political online environments than in overtly political 
spaces (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), social media—insofar as 
it is often used for non-political reasons—may enable seren-
dipitous exposure to views that are quite different from one’s 
own. Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela (2011) show that social 
media facilitates fortuitous contact with weak ties, which is 
likely to expose individuals to different political views. With 
respect to Twitter, Colleoni et al. (2014) suggest that the con-
nections users build between each other exhibit high degrees 
of homophily, but information can also circulate across dif-
ferent networks and, in the process, expose individuals to 
dissonant viewpoints (see also Barberá et al., 2015).
Given that most of the literature suggests that individu-
als are more likely to seek agreement than disagreement on 
social media, we expect political homophily to be prevalent 
on social media. Thus, we hypothesize that in general indi-
viduals are more likely to engage with supportive than 
oppositional or mixed networks on social media (H1).
Nevertheless, the literature also provides some evidence 
that, under certain circumstances and for certain kinds of 
users, political networks on social media may differ from the 
modal outcome of homogeneity. However, research on what 
these factors are and under what conditions they operate has 
been very limited so far. Although most studies assume that 
conversations on social media are characterized by some 
degree of user control, scholars have generally failed to study 
how different users employ control affordances, and what 
implications such choices may have. This is because most 
scholars have treated important aspects of social media usage 
as constants rather than variables. To address this gap in the 
literature, our next hypotheses move beyond a general 
assessment to address how different individual-level charac-
teristics may explain variation in exposure to supportive ver-
sus contrarian viewpoints on social media.
The Nexus Between Online and Offline Patterns 
of Political Discussion
We proceed from the premise that the role of social media in 
fostering or forestalling exposure to a diversity of political 
opinions cannot be understood without considering the spe-
cific goals and circumstances of different individuals’ social 
media activity as well as their broader patterns of political 
conversation. This is because (a) social media are fundamen-
tally intertwined with offline dynamics and (b) social media 
are high-choice environments in which individuals to some 
extent choose their levels of engagement with politics and 
the kinds of contents and sources they encounter.
Political networks on social media do not exist in a vac-
uum; they are part of a broader ecosystem of information 
flows in which individuals play different roles and exercise 
different degrees of agency. According to Chadwick (2013), 
contemporary political communication systems must be 
understood as “hybrid,” that is, combining different logics 
from older and newer media as well as integrating face-to-
face and digital modes of engagement. This model implies 
that we cannot consider social media as separate from, or 
independent of, face-to-face conversational contexts—as 
most prior research has done—and that if we are to under-
stand the role of social media in facilitating encounters with 
viewpoints that are dissonant versus consonant, we must 
take into account individuals’ offline discussion networks 
as well. Accordingly, research shows that individuals often 
use social media to connect (and reconnect) with members 
of their extended offline social networks (Ellison, Steinfield, 
& Lampe, 2007; Subrahmanyam, Reich, Waechter, & 
Espinoza, 2008). It is thus reasonable to expect that indi-
viduals’ patterns of offline conversation may be largely 
reproduced on social media, especially insofar as online 
interactions involve the same partners as face-to-face 
encounters.
Moreover, investigating the nexus between online and 
offline networks of political discussion helps to illuminate 
the various ways in which individuals approach political dis-
cussions in general. The “uses and gratifications” theory 
contends that individuals take advantage of the affordances 
of any medium of communication to fulfill their needs and 
preferences (Campbell & Kwak, 2010; Cho, Gil de Zúñiga, 
Rojas, & Shah, 2003). Taking offline networks into account 
when assessing online networks not only allows researchers 
to compare communication experiences in two different 
domains and platforms, it also facilitates an understanding of 
how given individuals differ in their overall approaches to 
political discussion writ large.
Finally, the extent to which individuals discuss poli-
tics—and the networks they develop—may be a function of 
their psychological characteristics, among other things. For 
instance, it is well known that individuals differ consider-
ably in the extent to which they value openness to new 
experiences—as opposed to the preservation of what is 
familiar and traditional—and the extent to which they 
exhibit open-mindedness in the context of opinion exchange 
(e.g., Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; McCrae, 1996; 
Rokeach, 1960; Schwartz, 2012). There is some evidence 
that these individual differences manifest themselves in 
terms of online behavior: people who score higher on open-
ness tend to have larger and more diverse social media con-
tacts and networks (Bachrach, Kosinski, Graepel, Kohli, & 
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Stillwell, 2012; Gosling, Augustine, Vazire, Holtzman, & 
Gaddis, 2011).
The hybridization of political communication, the uses 
and gratifications theory, and research on personality and 
social psychology all suggest that some degree of concor-
dance is to be expected when it comes to the degree of ideo-
logical homophily in individuals’ face-to-face and social 
media networks. Thus, we hypothesize that the political 
composition of discussion networks that individuals engage 
with on social media is similar to the composition of their 
offline networks (H2). Understanding the connections 
between face-to-face and online environments is also critical 
to assessing whether and under what circumstances the use 
of social media increases or decreases the overall diversity of 
political information to which one is exposed.
Political Habits on Social Media and Experience 
With Agreement and Disagreement
Once these individual circumstances and dispositions have 
been taken into account, we also need to consider how spe-
cific habits in the political use of social media may affect the 
likelihood that users encounter either agreement or disagree-
ment on these platforms. In a high-choice media environ-
ment, people are likely to be selective when it comes to 
political content they are exposed to and with whom they 
discuss such content, and this selectivity is likely to be 
greater for those who are high (vs. low) in the intensity with 
which they engage with politics on social media. This is 
because the sheer abundance of potential content and interac-
tion partners makes it not only possible, but also necessary, 
for individuals who are highly engaged in politics to filter 
out truly divergent perspectives. The more an individual is 
exposed to political content and engages in political discus-
sion, the more rational it is for him or her to filter messages 
in order to maximize utility while minimizing effort. 
Selecting predominantly like-minded sources and conversa-
tional partners is clearly one way of attaining efficiency in 
this regard. Moreover, the intensity of political discussion is 
likely to be a reliable indicator of the strength of political 
identification and discursive involvement.
The theory of motivated reasoning suggests that people 
tend to search for information that reinforces their preexist-
ing opinions and to avoid information that challenges them 
(Lodge & Taber, 2000; Stroud, 2008). The more involved in 
politics a given individual is, the more likely it is that he or 
she wishes to be part of an ideological community and, thus, 
to exercise selectivity in the context of social networks. 
Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell (2010) noted that most U.S. 
political blog readers—who are generally quite politically 
engaged—gravitate toward blogs that reinforce their own 
ideological inclinations, whereas very few read blogs across 
the entire ideological spectrum. Those who are highly 
involved in political discussions on social media may also be 
more likely to engage with like-minded others. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that the quantity of political messages that 
individuals exchange on social media is positively associ-
ated with the likelihood of engaging with supportive political 
networks on these platforms (H3).
Case Selection
Most studies of online discussion networks have focused on 
the United States. This means that we cannot be sure whether 
findings from these studies can be generalized to other 
Western democracies. We address this omission by focusing 
on Germany and Italy—two large, relatively affluent 
European democracies that held general elections in 2013 
and possess similar levels of Twitter diffusion (9% in Italy, 
7% in Germany).2 Unlike the United States, both Italy and 
Germany are parliamentary multiparty systems with mixed, 
but predominantly proportional, electoral laws. Although 
they differ from each other in some key respects—such as 
mean levels of political trust and the relative stability of 
party systems and governments—we do not expect these dif-
ferences to bear on the structure and function of online politi-
cal networks. It should be noted, given the goal of this 
research, that in multiparty systems it is often the case that 
parties pursue niche, bonding strategies aimed at mobilizing 
relatively narrow segments of the population (Norris, 2004, 
pp. 100-101). As a result, European citizens’ ideological 
preferences may be more fragmented and multidimensional 
in comparison with citizens of majoritarian systems such as 
the United States.
In testing our hypotheses in Germany and Italy, we want 
to assess the robustness of our findings across different 
national systems and to expand existing knowledge beyond 
singular case studies of the United States.
Data
Investigating political discussions on social media requires 
that we focus on those individuals who take part in such dis-
cussions rather than on the entire voting-age population or 
even social media users in general. We focus on Twitter 
because it is one of the most popular social media platforms 
worldwide and its structure makes it especially germane to 
our hypotheses, insofar as it facilitates serendipitous encoun-
ters with unanticipated information and is highly accessible to 
study, because most of the interactions can be retrieved and 
archived. Testing our hypotheses requires valid and reliable 
measures of the political activities performed by social media 
users, what motivates them, and what kinds of information 
they encounter. We, therefore, devised unique surveys of 
representative samples of individuals who engaged in elec-
tion-related conversations on Twitter in Germany and Italy. 
Compared with analyses of behavioral data of individuals’ 
interactions on social media, surveying representative sam-
ples of these users allows us to measure constructs, such as 
characteristics of face-to-face interactions, which may not be 
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observable on the basis of social media activities alone. The 
potential downside is that our results could be an artifact of 
the extent that respondents systematically misreport charac-
teristics of online and offline networks.3 Moreover, as with all 
cross-sectional surveys, our data are subject to some degree 
of endogeneity and, therefore, do not support causal interpre-
tations of claims regarding the associations we observe.
Sampling Political Users of Twitter
Because no comprehensive list of Twitter users—let alone, 
Twitter users who discuss elections—is publicly available, 
we devised a strategy to construct sampling frames that are 
as inclusive as possible with respect to our populations. 
Because most of the sources and messages posted by 
Twitter users are publicly accessible,4 we rely on the con-
tents of these messages to identify our populations, which 
we define as those Twitter users who posted messages 
concerning the German and Italian elections of 2013. 
We pinpoint these users on the basis of election-related 
keywords—the names of the main parties, their leaders, and 
the topical hashtags for the elections5—contained in the 
messages they posted. We used these keywords to query 
Twitter’s Streaming API during each country’s extended 
campaign season6 and retrieved about 5.8 million tweets 
from over 151,000 unique users in Germany and 3 million 
tweets from over 275,000 unique users in Italy.7
Fielding a Survey of Twitter Users
From these lists of users, we randomly selected 43,000 users 
in Germany and 35,000 in Italy and contacted them via 
Twitter through an automated script that delivered a person-
alized message as follows: “@[username] University 
research on social media use: Would you like to participate? 
[link to the survey].”8 Because our invitations were delivered 
in such a way that recipients were asked to share their opin-
ions with strangers via social media, respondents to our sur-
veys may differ from those who refused to answer in terms of 
their willingness to express their opinions to strangers. 
People who are more open to engaging with strangers on 
social media might also be more likely to encounter dis-
agreeing opinions on these platforms. As a result, it is possi-
ble that our sample may overestimate exposure to political 
disagreement online. Although we acknowledge this poten-
tial bias, we emphasize that it works against our first and 
third hypotheses (see above), while it does not affect our 
ability to validly test our second hypothesis. In sum, we have 
no reason to believe that our findings are an artifact of the 
method we chose to contact our respondents.
A total of 1,143 (Germany) and 1,493 (Italy) individuals 
answered at least half of the questions, which corresponds 
to response rates of 4%.9 Because these are by no means 
high figures—although they are not much lower than the 
single-digit response rates that are common in telephone 
surveys10—in Appendices B and C11 we illustrate evidence 
suggesting that our respondents may be considered represen-
tative of Germans and Italians who discussed the 2013 elec-
tions on Twitter, and that the differences that could be 
measured between these two groups were taken into account 
in our analysis.12
Political Users of Twitter Versus General 
Population Samples
Understanding the behaviors of representative samples of 
Twitter users who commented on their countries’ elections 
enables us to understand political communication on social 
media platforms and the factors that shape it (see Bekafigo 
& McBride, 2013 and Bode & Dalrymple, 2014, for other 
representative surveys of Twitter users). At the same time, 
focusing on the specific population of individuals who 
posted at least one election-related tweet does not allow us 
to generalize to other populations, such as citizens who 
read (but do not post) political messages on Twitter. To the 
extent that our survey respondents were more engaged in 
politics than the general population, we would expect—on 
the basis of prior research (e.g., Mutz, 2006)—that they 
would be less eager to engage with contrary views; we take 
this possibility into account by controlling for relevant 
political attitudes in our analyses.13
Variables
Although our respondents were recruited via Twitter, our pri-
mary independent and dependent measures focus on general 
social media use because individuals’ online interactions, 
political and otherwise, are not limited to one platform, but 
often integrate many of them: For instance, a person can use 
Twitter to share a YouTube video, a Facebook status update, 
or an Instagram picture. When we asked respondents to 
indicate social networking platforms on which they had a 
profile, the median respondent had profiles in 4 of 10 plat-
forms we asked about in Italy and 5 of 10 in Germany.
Our dependent variables measure the types of political 
networks that individuals engage with on social media, in 
response to two questions: “How often do you [agree/dis-
agree] with the political opinions and contents that other 
people post on social media?” Respondents could answer 
with one of four categories:
•• Always or nearly always (4% of German and 0.6% of 
Italian respondents for agreement; 1% of Germans 
and 0.8% of Italians for disagreement);
•• Often (43.1% of German and 42.4% of Italian respon-
dents for agreement; 18.1% of Germans and 21.8% of 
Italians for disagreement);
•• Only sometimes (50.3% of German and 55.9% of 
Italian respondents for agreement; 77.8% of Germans 
and 76.3% of Italians for disagreement);
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•• Never (2.6% of German and 1.1% of Italian respon-
dents for agreement; 3.1% of Germans and 1.1% of 
Italians for disagreement).
As Nir (2011) showed, mixed political networks have 
important implications for political engagement, and should 
thus not be treated simply as an intermediate category 
between supportive and oppositional ones. This is why we 
use as dependent variables dichotomous measures represent-
ing each of these types of networks rather than a combined 
ordinal measure of the continuum of supportive, mixed, and 
oppositional networks. Because only about 5% of respon-
dents used the most extreme categories, we combined the 
first two and the last two response categories and then con-
structed a composite measure corresponding to four types of 
network structures:
•• Respondents who claimed to always or often encoun-
ter agreement and rarely or never disagreement were 
classified as participating in supportive networks;
•• Respondents who claimed to always or often encoun-
ter disagreement and rarely or never agreement were 
classified as participating in oppositional networks;
•• Respondents who claimed to always or often encoun-
ter both agreement and disagreement were classified 
as participating in mixed networks,
•• Respondents who claimed to rarely or never encoun-
ter agreement or disagreement were classified as par-
ticipating in neutral networks.14
The independent variables required to test our hypotheses 
involve the characteristics of respondents’ offline political 
networks (H2) and the proportion of political messages they 
exchange on social media (H3).
We test H2 by focusing on responses to the questions 
“How often do you usually [agree/disagree] with the 
opinions of people with whom you talk about politics?” 
These questions immediately followed a specific question 
about how frequently respondents discussed politics in 
face-to-face contacts with friends and family. The response 
modes were the same as for the questions about social 
media, and we derived combined measures of supportive 
(36.5% of German and 34.8% of Italian respondents), 
oppositional (16.6% of German and 25.2% of Italian 
respondents), mixed (8.6% of German and 8.2% of Italian 
respondents), and neutral (38.3% of German and 31.8% of 
Italian respondents) offline networks in the same ways as we 
did for social media networks.
We test H3 by averaging answers to two separate ques-
tions, one for posting and one for reading political messages. 
The questions were: “Thinking about everything you have 
recently [posted/read from people you follow or are in con-
tact with] on social media, such as status updates, comments, 
or links to news stories—about how much is related to poli-
tics, political issues or the 2013 elections?”
Respondents could answer both questions by indicating a 
number between 0 (none) and 10 (all).15 The resulting vari-
able averaged 4.46 (SD = 2.58) for the German and 4.46 (SD 
= 2.27) for the Italian sample.
Findings
Bearing on H1, Figure 1 shows the percentages of German 
and Italian respondents who engage with supportive, opposi-
tional, mixed, and neutral political networks on social media. 
Respondents are substantially more likely to engage with 
supportive rather than oppositional networks (40.6% vs. 
12.5% in Germany and 35.8% vs. 15.3% in Italy), and in 
both cases, the differences are statistically significant.16 
Participation in networks that exhibit disagreement with 
respondents’ opinions is not, however, infrequent: In both 
countries, oppositional and mixed networks (combined) 
affect one in five respondents—one in three if we exclude 
those in “neutral” networks that are disengaged from poli-
tics. These findings support H1, insofar as respondents on 
average encounter more agreement than disagreement, but 
they also suggest that for some people, social media plat-
forms are not “echo chambers” of univocal agreement, but 
“contrarian clubs” where political disagreement is common. 
Another interesting finding is that about two in five of our 
respondents participate in networks in which no particular 
political opinions emerge, and this group is the modal one in 
the Italian sample. Thus, even among those social media 
users who communicated at least once about the election, 
exposure to very few political opinions is approximately as 
likely as exposure to attitude-congruent opinions.
We address our remaining hypotheses by conducting 
three logistic regressions (summarized in Table 1)17 that, in 
each country, predict whether respondents report being part 
of supportive, oppositional, or mixed political networks on 
social media as a function of the characteristics of their 
offline political networks (H2), and the proportion of politi-
cal messages they exchange on social media (H3).
The models include control variables for socio-demo-
graphic characteristics,18 political attitudes (political efficacy, 
interest in politics, and trust in political parties), frequency of 
offline political discussion, and frequency of use of different 
media to get political information. We also control for respon-
dents’ preferred use of social media, distinguishing between 
those who claimed to consider social media to be more impor-
tant for finding people with similar (vs. different) viewpoints, 
in comparison with their own.19 We introduced this variable 
in accordance with the “uses and gratification” theory, which 
contends that individuals’ preferences may shape the type of 
conversational experiences they have on social media. 
Controlling for respondents’ preferred use of social media 
provides a more precise assessment of the specific role played 
by broader patterns of political conversation as well as habits 
in the political use of social media when it comes to the devel-
opment of citizens’ online networks.20
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As can be seen from the first block of coefficients in Table 
1, H2 is supported in both countries, insofar as we see posi-
tive and significant associations between all relevant pairs of 
independent and dependent variables. As an example of the 
strength of these associations, if we construct a hypothetical 
Italian respondent that has values equal to the median (for 
interval and ordinal variables) or modal (for categorical vari-
ables) values in the sample, then the probability that this 
hypothetical (male) respondent would engage with supportive 
political networks on social media is 48% if he also engages 
with supportive offline networks, but only 26% if he engages 
with either mixed, oppositional, or neutral offline networks. 
The results also highlight some interesting differences 
between the two countries. While in Germany respondents 
who engage with oppositional networks offline are signifi-
cantly more likely to encounter either oppositional or mixed 
networks online, in Italy engagement with offline opposi-
tional networks is solely associated with oppositional net-
works on social media. By contrast, whereas in Germany 
those who engage with mixed offline networks are more 
likely to engage with the same types of networks on social 
media, in Italy those who are part of mixed offline networks 
are significantly more likely to interact with either opposi-
tional or mixed networks on social media. Individuals’ online 
and offline experiences tend to overlap, but to the extent that 
they do not overlap perfectly, social media functions as an 
echo chamber only for those individuals who also possess 
homogeneous offline networks. Another way to interpret these 
associations is that political networks on social media are 
more likely to add to than detract from the overall diversity 
of political viewpoints to which individuals are exposed.21
The data also support H3, namely the expectation of a 
positive association between the intensity of online political 
involvement and the probability of participating in support-
ive networks.22 In both countries, the more individuals post 
and read political messages on social media, the more likely 
they are to engage with supportive networks. As an example, 
if we set all variables to their median or modal levels in the 
German sample, a hypothetical respondent has a 39% prob-
ability of engaging with a supportive network. If, however, 
the intensity of his or her activity is increased to one standard 
deviation above the median, the probability of engaging with 
supportive networks increases to 49%. Conversely, if the 
intensity of his or her activity is set one standard deviation 
below the median, the probability of engaging with support-
ive networks decreases to 30%.
Finally, the associations pertaining to the control variable 
measuring preferences for political agreement versus dis-
agreement on social media deserve a brief comment. In both 
countries, respondents who attribute greater importance to 
social media for encountering agreement as opposed to dis-
agreement (positive values of the variable) are significantly 
more likely to engage with supportive networks on these 
platforms. To the contrary, the association between such 
variable (where respondents valuing social media as more 
important for encountering disagreeing than agreeing others 
have negative values) and engagement with oppositional 
views is negative in both countries, but it is significant only 
Figure 1. Engagement with different types of political networks on social media (percentages among country respondents).
Note. Percentages based on self-reports, see text for coding of responses on network political agreement and disagreement into reported categories. 
Paired samples two-tailed t test gave the following results: supportive versus mixed networks t = 11.782 (p = .000) in Germany and t = 10.565 (p = .000) in 
Italy; supportive versus mixed networks t = 15.386 (p = .000) in Germany and t = 16.515 (p = .000) in Italy; oppositional versus mixed networks t = 2.945 
(p = .009) in Germany and t = 5.843 (p = .000) in Italy; neutral versus supportive networks t = −0.101 (p = .920) in Germany and t = 2.371 (p = .018) in Italy; 
neutral versus oppositional networks t = 8.081 (p = .000) in Germany and t = 13.077 (p = .000) in Italy; neutral versus mixed networks t = 13.234 (p = .000) in 
Germany and t = 19.609 (p = .000) in Italy.
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in Italy. This pattern may suggest that, for individuals who 
approach social media deliberately in search of agreement 
(vs. disagreement), it may be relatively easy to obtain such 
agreement. Instead, for those preferring to seek out disagree-
ment, it may be more difficult to locate and participate in 
“contrarian clubs.”
Conclusion
We have shown that German and Italian Twitter users who 
communicate about elections are more likely to do so in net-
works that support rather than challenge their views, consis-
tent with the notion that social media facilitates the emergence 
of echo chambers. At the same time, contrarian clubs, which 
involve frequent encounters with dissonant opinions—
whether in oppositional or mixed networks—are less excep-
tional than expected. We may have come across an important 
parallelism between studies of political communication 
offline and online: As noted by Huckfeldt et al. (2004) with 
respect to offline networks, heterogeneity persists on social 
media even though homogeneity is the modal outcome.
We have approached citizens’ experiences with political 
agreement and disagreement on social media through the 
theoretical lenses of hybridization in political communica-
tion and of “uses and gratifications” theory, while at the same 
time taking into account the importance of individual atti-
tudes in high-choice media environments. This, in turn, led 
us to focus on aspects that are likely to differentiate individu-
als, as opposed to treating everyone as guided by technologi-
cal affordances in the same way. Thus, we have been able to 
demonstrate that the extent to which social media functions 
as an echo chamber (as opposed to a contrarian club) varies 
across individuals. This, in turn, suggests that understanding 
political dynamics in choice-enhancing platforms may be 
better served by an appreciation that different users have 
different traits, preferences, and social networks that affect 
Table 1. Dependent Variable(s): Types of Political Networks Respondents Engage With on Social Media.
Germany Italy
 Supportive Oppositional Mixed Supportive Oppositional Mixed
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive 0.818** −0.201 0.832 0.998*** 0.183 0.580
Oppositional −0.381 0.899* 1.200* 0.040 1.756*** 0.228
Mixed −0.365 0.489 1.696** 0.032 1.082** 2.072***
Ratio of political messages on the total exchanged on  
social media
0.153*** −0.041 0.149 0.120** −0.058 0.126
Preferred use of social media 1.240** −1.032 0.224 1.714*** −1.056* −0.675
Source of political information
Internet 0.078 1.023 −0.386 0.171 −0.488 −0.983
Newspapers −0.460 0.360 −0.167 −0.690* 0.060 −0.433
Radio −1.046*** 0.612 0.562 −0.508* 0.005 0.815
Television −0.406 −0.264 −0.008 0.078 −0.068 0.911
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” 0.108 −0.201 −0.581 0.042 0.469 −0.048
“Public officials don’t care” 0.167 −0.375 0.849 0.338 −0.239 −0.886
“Politics is too complicated” −0.660 −0.039 0.799 −0.098 0.000 0.311
Interest in politics 1.601** −0.923 0.846 −0.141 0.805 1.969
Trust in political parties −0.276 −0.641 0.597 0.379 −0.386 −0.768
Offline political discussion (frequency) 0.079 0.661 −0.118 0.257 −1.014 −0.587
Gender (male) −0.128 −0.227 0.367 −0.211 0.041 0.212
Age −0.712 −1.051 −0.401 −0.561 −0.347 −0.798
Education −0.431 1.025 −1.042 0.361 0.290 0.614
Income −0.582 1.421 0.812 −0.094 0.227 −0.528
Constant −0.667 −3.087** −5.569*** −1.348** −1.893** −4.822***
N 727 727 727 1,167 1,167 1,167
Percentage correctly predicted 69.9 86.5 93.4 68.7 85.1 93.4
Nagelkerke R2 .241 .125 .141 .164 .157 .143
Log-likelihood 834.045 518.951 312.860 1,391.319 889.100 503.732
Note. Cell entries are estimated logit coefficients where the dependent variable is 1 for the reported network type, and all other network types are coded 
as 0. See Appendices E to J for complete results with standard errors. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table, 
see note 18. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1, with respondents 
who claimed that agreement was more important than disagreement having positive values, whereas those who stated that disagreement was more 
important than agreement having negative values, and those who attributed equal importance to agreement and disagreement having a score of zero).
***p ⩽ .001. **p ⩽ .01. *p ⩽ .05.
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their behaviors and experiences rather than an assumption 
that most or all users employ the selective features of social 
media to pursue the same goals, thus leading to fairly pre-
dictable and monolithic outcomes.
More specifically, we hope to have shed light on broader 
dynamics of political communication as well as specific 
habits pertaining to the political use of social media that 
help to explain how various platforms give rise to different 
types of political networks. Our observation that online and 
offline networks tend to resemble one another suggests that 
understanding the dynamics of political communication 
requires a holistic approach that encompasses both con-
texts. As increasing numbers of citizens rely on social 
media for political information, which they often encounter 
by discussing public affairs with others, the overall diver-
sity of viewpoints in contemporary democracies is not 
likely to be dramatically reduced when compared with 
face-to-face discussions; in some cases, it may even be 
broadened. However, the use of social media seems to 
diminish political diversity for those who participate in 
more or less entirely supportive offline networks and 
who prefer engaging with people with whom they tend 
to agree.
At the level of individual behavior online, our finding 
that the more people post and read political messages on 
social media, the more likely they are to encounter support-
ive networks indicates that, all else being equal, the greatest 
proportion of social media messages exchanged involve 
interactions among individuals who agree with one another. 
This highlights a crucial methodological issue in the study 
of online political communication. To the extent that the 
quantity of messages and interactions that can be observed 
on social media is associated with the levels of agreement 
among individuals who take part in these exchanges, schol-
ars interested in the implications of social media for politi-
cal diversity should be aware that taking messages or 
connections as their unit of analysis may overestimate the 
pervasiveness of homogeneity as actually experienced by 
individuals.
Finally, our study has confirmed the centrality of hybrid-
ity in contemporary environments of political discussion. 
Building on Chadwick’s (2013) theorizing, we have investi-
gated the relationship between newer (i.e., social media) and 
older (i.e., face-to-face) networks of political discussion, and 
have observed that these two types of environments—and 
their underlying logics—are integrated rather than separated. 
Our findings also have important implications for power—a 
crucial component of Chadwick’s theory—insofar as they 
suggest that politically active citizens will be unlikely to find 
much challenging content on social media, but they may be 
able to reach less engaged users—who according to our find-
ings are less likely to be part of exclusively homophilic 
networks—with oppositional points of view. Under certain 
conditions, these interactions could create opportunities for 
political persuasion and, thus, the possibility for some to 
exercise influence over others.
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Notes
 1. Networks can also be “neutral” to the extent that members are 
not exposed to substantial levels of agreement or disagree-
ment—a category that we treat as residual for the purposes of 
this study.
 2. See http://wearesocial.net/blog/2014/01/social-digital-mobile-
worldwide-2014/ (accessed 31 July 2014). We are aware that 
these figures indicate low usage rates in the two countries. 
However, even in countries where Twitter rates are higher, such 
as the United States (around 17% of Americans used Twitter 
in 2014), usage rates are still rather limited. Therefore, as we 
seek to clarify in the subsection “Political users of Twitter versus 
general population samples,” we do not claim that our findings 
are generalizable to populations others than political users of 
Twitter in the two countries. At the same time, we consider these 
samples useful for understanding online political networks.
 3. We are aware that there may be social desirability bias in users’ 
reported exposure to oppositional networks. However, observ-
ing users’ behavior in engaging with disagreement on social 
media—even if limited to only one platform, that is, Twitter—
would have required a very extensive exercise of data collec-
tion, which is outside the scope of this article, and still would 
have left us without any reliable measure of the characteris-
tics of users’ offline political networks, which is crucial to our 
theory and hypotheses. That being said, we believe the social 
desirability bias, to the extent it was present in our data, should 
not have substantially affected our findings.
 4. The only messages that are inaccessible are those by users who 
“protect” their profiles, making their posts visible only to those 
who “follow” them. Because only 5% of Twitter accounts are 
protected (Liu, Kliman-Silver, & Mislove, 2014), our inability 
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to observe protected tweets should not substantially bias our 
findings.
 5. The full list of keywords is reported in Appendix A.
 6. Retrieval dates were 28 June 2013 to 22 September 2013 for 
Germany and 18 January 2013 to 28 February 2013 for Italy.
 7. The fact that we spent more time crawling tweets for the 
German (vs. Italian) election explains why we have more 
tweets for the former. Because we used comparable search 
keywords, the numbers of unique users that we obtained for 
each country are consistent with Twitter diffusion rates.
 8. Although these messages are technically public, because they 
were addressed specifically to the users in our samples, no 
one else on Twitter could see them unless they followed our 
account (which had no followers) or were searching based on 
keywords included in our message. Some addressees might 
have shared the link to our survey with other people and so, 
in principle, some users outside of our samples may have 
taken the survey. In the German survey, we asked respondents 
whether they had received a direct message from us and found 
that 94% reported that they did. We deleted from our data 
set all the information from respondents who had not received 
a direct invitation from us. Although we did not employ this 
control for the Italian survey, in a follow-up study, we found 
that 97% of respondents had received a direct personal invita-
tion from us. Controls based on IP addresses ensured that the 
surveys could be answered only once from the same computer. 
Because we filtered the Italian, but not the German tweets by 
language, and because, unlike Italian, German is widely spoken 
abroad, we asked individuals contacted for the German survey 
whether they were German citizens or residents, and excluded 
the 39% who answered negatively. This percentage was quite 
high because the keywords we searched for are likely to be dis-
cussed outside Germany. For instance, the German chancellor 
is often featured in the news of most European Union countries 
due to her central role in European Union (EU) politics.
 9. The surveys were in the field for about 2 months in Italy and 
4 months in Germany. Such prolonged fieldwork was moti-
vated by two considerations. First, logistical considerations 
forced us to limit the number of invitations we sent out each 
day. Second, we attempted to contact most respondents twice 
in order to increase the response rate.
10. For instance, Pew reported average 9% response rates for 
its telephone surveys in 2012. See http://www.people-press.
org/2012/05/15/assessing-the-representativeness-of-public-
opinion-surveys/ (accessed 21 August 2014).
11. All Appendices can also be accessed at http://webpoleu.
altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SM+S-appendix-
online-nw.pdf
12. See also Vaccari et al. (2015) for a detailed description of the 
methods we employed to assess and improve the representa-
tiveness of our sample.
13. We did not measure respondents’ partisanship because this 
concept has proved to be more difficult to measure, and less 
useful in the study of voting behavior, outside the United 
States and United Kingdom (see Holmberg, 2007). Also, we 
did not measure respondents’ online and offline discussion 
network size, which is likely to be associated with the het-
erogeneity of the views they are exposed to (Gil de Zúñiga & 
Valenzuela, 2011).
14. By including respondents (coded as “0”) who rarely or never 
encounter agreement or disagreement on social media, and who 
can thus be expected to be disengaged from political discus-
sions, we may confound individuals’ political networks with 
the frequency with which they discuss politics. We address 
this problem in our multivariate analyses by controlling for 
intensity of political discussion. Moreover, we tested alterna-
tive models in which respondents in neutral political networks 
were omitted rather than coded as “0.” These models, reported 
in Appendix D, yield findings consistent with the results of the 
main models reported in Table 1.
15. In the Italian questionnaire, the scale ranged from 0 to 100, so 
we divided the values by 10 to make these variables compa-
rable across countries.
16. t = 11.782 (p = .000) in Germany and t = 10.565 (p = .000) in 
Italy according to paired samples t tests (two-tailed).
17. Table 1 reports estimated logit coefficients. Full statistical 
information on our models is reported in Appendices E to J.
18. Because our income variable included a large proportion of 
missing data, rather than introducing bias through listwise 
deletion (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001), we mean-
replaced these missing values and added a dummy variable 
to the analysis to identify these cases. In this framework, the 
coefficient for any given variable with missing data should 
be interpreted as the effect of that variable on our dependent 
variable for the cases for which we have observations of the 
independent variable in question. We thank Larry Bartels for 
suggesting this approach. The coefficients for the dummy 
variables identifying the missing cases—which are essentially 
meaningless because they are simply a function of whatever 
value we use to replace the missing observations—are not 
included in the tables.
19. For question wording, response modes, and descriptive statis-
tics related to all control variables, see Appendix K.
20. In Appendix L we show that all our findings hold even if we 
exclude this variable from the models.
21. As we show in Appendices M and N, these patterns are 
also revealed by bivariate analyses: For instance, 56% of 
Germans and 52% of Italians who engage with support-
ive networks offline also engage with supportive networks 
online.
22. As can be seen in Appendix D, when we excluded respon-
dents in neutral networks, intensity of political discussion 
was positively but not significantly related with engage-
ment with supportive networks, but it was negatively and 
significantly related with engagement with oppositional 
networks. We see this finding as the other side of the coin 
of the finding in our main models: In one case, the more 
intensely respondents discuss politics on social media, the 
more likely they are to do so with supportive networks; in 
the other case, the more intensely respondents discuss poli-
tics on social media, the less likely they are to do so with 
oppositional networks.
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Appendix A
Keywords Employed to Retrieve Election-Related 
Tweets
Germany
Political parties
AFD
CDU
CSU
FDP
Grünen
Linke
Piratenpartei
SPD
Party leaders
Brüderle
Göring-Eckardt
Kipping
Lucke
Merkel
Riexinger
Rösler
Schlömer
Seehofer
Steinbrück
Trittin
Election hashtags
#btw2013
#Bundestagswahl2013
#wahl2013
Italy
Political parties
IDV
Lega
M5S
PD
PDL
Rivoluzione Civile
Scelta Civica
SEL
UDC
Party leaders
Berlusconi
Bersani
Vaccari et al. 13
Casini
Di Pietro
Grillo
Ingroia
Maroni
Monti
Vendola
Election hashtags
#elezioni2013
Appendix B
Assessment of Sample Representativeness
In this section, we illustrate evidence suggesting that our 
respondents can be considered representative of Germans 
and Italians who discussed the 2013 elections on Twitter, and 
that the differences that could be measured between these 
two groups were taken into account in our analysis.
To substantiate this claim, we need to combine and com-
pare information about our respondents and all the users we 
invited to take our surveys, and to achieve this goal we inte-
grate our survey data with observations of Twitter activity. 
With regard to our respondents, we know their answers to our 
survey questions, but—at least for the majority of them—we 
do not know their social media activities (such as how often 
they posted messages, how many accounts they followed, and 
the like) because selection into our surveys was anonymous. 
With regard to all the users we invited to participate in our 
surveys, we know their social media activities because Twitter 
usage is public and we can measure this behavior regardless 
of whether or not someone chose to take our surveys, but we 
of course do not know how they would have answered our 
questions. However, approximately 40% of our respondents 
chose to provide us with their Twitter handle, so for this sub-
sample we have both of these types of information: the 
answers to our survey questions and their behavior on Twitter. 
Thus, we can compare how similar this portion of our respon-
dents are to all the users we invited to participate in our sur-
vey (based on Twitter activity) and how similar they are to 
respondents who did not give us their Twitter handles (via the 
survey data). We also employ a number of techniques devel-
oped by scholars to estimate characteristics of Twitter users 
such as gender, location, and ideology.
In particular, gender was estimated using a Naive Bayes 
classifier (Bird, Klein, & Loper, 2009) trained with a list of 
common Italian and German names and their gender, and 
then applied to the name of each Twitter user, as reported on 
their profile. We found that this technique is able to accu-
rately classify the gender of 90% of Twitter users. Each 
user’s location was identified by parsing the “location” field 
in each profile using the Data Science Toolkit geocoder 
(http://www.datasciencetoolkit.org), which turns text into a 
set of coordinates, which we then matched to Italian and 
German regions. We were able to identify the region in which 
each user lives in 60% of cases in Italy and 51% of cases in 
Germany. Finally, ideology was measured using the “spatial 
following model” described in Barberá (2015), which esti-
mates ideology based on the political actors and media out-
lets that each Twitter user follows. We found that this method 
is able to classify the self-reported ideological positions 
(left-right) of Italian respondents in our survey with 82% 
accuracy and of German respondents with 71% accuracy.
This information in turn allows us to compare Twitter 
users who answered the surveys with all those we contacted 
not just in terms of Twitter behavior, but also in terms of 
socio-demographic and political characteristics, and there-
fore evaluate whether the former is representative of the lat-
ter. As those invited to take the surveys were selected 
randomly, this process should allow us to ensure that our 
samples are representative of Germans and Italians who 
tweeted about the elections and, to the extent that they are 
not, to reweight the data accordingly.
As shown in Appendix C, respondents who provided their 
Twitter usernames were similar to those who answered the 
survey but did not provide their usernames in terms of demo-
graphic characteristics, interest in politics, and ideology. 
When compared with all the users we asked to participate in 
the survey, survey respondents turned out to follow more 
politicians’ accounts and to have posted more tweets about 
the election, although there was no difference in terms of the 
popularity of different keywords posted by the two groups; 
in Germany, they were also more likely to be male.
To better ensure that our survey respondents are represen-
tative of the populations of Twitter users who tweeted about 
these elections, we weight our analyses by gender, region, 
number of political accounts followed, and number of tweets 
posted that mentioned any of our keywords. This approach 
is commonly adopted by survey researchers to ensure that 
sample margins match population margins in a set of key 
variables (Gellman & Hill, 2007, pp. 310-319). For those 
respondents who did not provide their Twitter usernames, we 
imputed five sets of values for the latter two variables using 
a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method (Gellman & Hill, 
2007). We then computed five different sets of weights and 
ran multiple analyses using each of them, the results of which 
were then aggregated. Because we only weighted those cases 
for which we had information concerning all four variables, 
the total number of cases in our analyses is 999 for Germany 
and 1,408 for Italy. Therefore, while we do not argue that our 
samples are representative of the German and Italian popula-
tions as a whole, we do feel confident—when using the 
weighted analyses—that they are fairly representative of 
Germans and Italians who talked about the 2013 elections on 
Twitter, at least in so far as their online political activity, gen-
der, and region is concerned.
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Appendix C. Characteristics of Twitter Users Invited to Take the Survey, of Twitter Users Who Participated in the Survey and 
Provided Their Twitter Account Names, and of Twitter Users Who Participated in the Survey and Did Not Provide Their Twitter 
Account Names.
Socio-political characteristics Germany Italy
 Did not give 
username
Gave username p Did not give 
username
Gave username p
Percentage female 30.5 22.2 .003 40.5 37.3 .210
Average age (years) 34.9 35.1 .841 32.0 32.0 .942
Average educational level (0-1) .65 .62 .010 .64 .62 .077
Average income bracket (0-1) .49 .46 .073 .46 .45 .359
Average interest in politics (0-1) .80 .82 .082 .75 .79 <.001
Ideology (left-right, 0-1) .32 .33 .537 .38 .37 .803
Total 665 478 880 613  
Twitter activities Invited to survey Gave username p Invited to survey Gave username p
Percentage female (estimated) 51.7 38.4 <.001 38.2 38.3 .992
Number of followers 865 651 .069 236 239 .883
Total number of tweets 8,695 7,291 .053 3,223 2,983 .574
Tweets mentioning political keywords 6.86 25.04 <.001 12 31 <.001
Number of days since account created 672 930 <.001 605 781 <.001
Number of political accounts followed 5.95 17.49 <.001 11 20 <.001
Ideology (left-right, −3 to +3)a −0.01 −0.03 0.239 −0.31 −0.44 0.022
Total 42,647 393 55,245 585  
aIdeology was estimated based on the method described in Barberá (2015).
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Appendix D. Dependent Variable(s): Types of Political Networks Respondents Engage With on Social Media (Respondents Engaging in 
Neutral Networks Excluded From Analysis).
Germany Italy
 Supportive Oppositional Mixed Supportive Oppositional Mixed
Face-to-face political networks (ref. mixed)
Supportive 1.457** −1.085 −1.191* 1.556*** −0.809* −1.568***
Oppositional −0.124 0.707 −0.745 0.169 0.988** −1.931***
Ratio of political messages on the total 
exchanged on social media
0.115 −0.242* 0.130 0.068 −0.173** 0.162
Preferred use of social media 1.751* −2.095* −0.576 1.852*** −1.806** −0.841
Source of political information
Internet 0.399 0.480 −1.170 0.568 −0.308 −0.707
Newspapers −0.796 1.078 0.116 −0.567 1.088* −0.682
Radio −1.153* 1.521* −0.056 −0.327 −0.027 0.826
Television −0.599 0.129 0.667 −0.354 −0.054 0.880
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” 0.570 −0.106 −0.924 −0.425 0.420 0.231
“Public officials don’t care” −0.424 −0.296 1.271 0.864* −0.505 −0.929
“Politics is too complicated” −0.216 −0.504 1.222 0.089 −0.146 0.073
Interest in politics −1.482 1.916 −0.183 −1.073 0.563 1.378
Trust in political parties −0.016 −1.181 1.275 0.280 −0.041 −0.523
Offline political discussion 0.793 −0.641 −0.629 1.158 −0.604 −1.478
Gender (male) 0.104 −0.539 0.508 −0.098 0.027 0.149
Age 0.289 −0.429 −0.381 0.277 0.423 −1.518
Education −0.851 1.107 0.065 0.080 −0.689 1.111
Income −1.230 1.165 0.977 −0.525 0.654 −0.099
Constant 1.656 −2.381* −2.654* −0.715 −0.308 −1.556
N 322 322 322 560 560 560
Nagelkerke R2 .291 .327 .176 .250 .281 .159
Log-likelihood 328.511 247.812 211.579 618.599 522.760 348.143
Note. Cell entries are log odds. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from 
political messages exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
***p ⩽ .001. **p ⩽ .01. *p ⩽ .05.
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Appendix E. German Respondents—Dependent Variable: Engagement With Supportive Political Networks on Social Media.
B SE p exp(B) 95% CI for exp(B) 99% CI for exp(B)
 min max min max
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive 0.818 0.241 .002 2.265 1.390 3.692 1.178 4.357
Oppositional −0.381 0.306 .217 0.683 0.371 1.258 0.304 1.537
Mixed −0.365 0.372 .328 0.694 0.332 1.449 0.262 1.837
Ratio of political messages on the 
total exchanged on social media
0.153 0.042 .000 1.165 1.073 1.266 1.045 1.299
Preferred use of social media 1.240 0.436 .006 3.455 1.447 8.254 1.087 10.983
Source of political information
Internet 0.078 0.441 .859 1.082 0.455 2.573 0.346 3.385
Newspapers −0.460 0.330 .164 0.631 0.330 1.207 0.269 1.481
Radio −1.046 0.284 .000 0.351 0.201 0.613 0.169 0.731
Television −.406 0.332 .223 0.666 0.345 1.286 0.279 1.590
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” 0.108 0.476 .823 1.114 0.413 3.003 0.289 4.301
“Public officials don’t care” 0.167 0.437 .704 1.181 0.494 2.824 0.371 3.760
“Politics is too complicated” −0.660 0.348 .058 0.517 0.261 1.024 .211 1.270
Interest in politics 1.601 0.538 .003 4.958 1.722 14.277 1.232 19.948
Trust in political parties −0.276 0.504 .587 0.759 0.274 2.104 0.194 2.971
Offline political discussion 0.079 0.396 .841 1.083 0.495 2.366 0.386 3.039
Gender (male) −0.128 0.208 .541 0.880 0.583 1.328 0.511 1.516
Age −0.712 0.553 .200 0.491 0.165 1.464 0.116 2.079
Education −0.431 0.503 .393 0.650 0.239 1.765 0.173 2.444
Income −0.582 0.437 .183 0.559 0.237 1.315 0.181 1.721
Constant −0.667 0.523 .202 0.513 0.184 1.429 0.133 1.973
N 727  
Nagelkerke R2 .241  
Log-likelihood 834.045  
Percentage correctly predicted 69.9  
Note. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages 
exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
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Appendix F. German Respondents—Dependent Variable: Engagement With Oppositional Political Networks on Social Media.
B SE p exp(B) 95% CI for exp(B) 99% CI for exp(B)
 min max min Max
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive −0.201 0.343 .561 0.818 0.413 1.622 0.330 2.029
Oppositional 0.899 0.350 .012 2.458 1.227 4.924 0.979 6.170
Mixed 0.489 0.492 .322 1.630 0.615 4.321 0.449 5.921
Ratio of political messages on the 
total exchanged on social media
−0.041 0.062 .509 0.960 0.849 1.085 0.816 1.128
Preferred use of social media −1.032 0.578 .078 0.356 0.113 1.127 0.077 1.640
Source of political information
Internet 1.023 0.651 .117 2.782 0.774 10.000 0.516 14.991
Newspapers 0.360 0.429 .401 1.434 0.619 3.322 0.475 4.327
Radio 0.612 0.436 .165 1.844 0.773 4.403 0.580 5.860
Television −0.264 0.464 .571 0.768 0.305 1.934 0.226 2.614
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” −0.201 0.556 .718 0.818 0.273 2.450 0.192 3.477
“Public officials don’t care” −0.375 0.618 .546 0.688 0.200 2.359 0.134 3.536
“Politics is too complicated” −0.039 0.521 .940 0.962 0.338 2.734 0.239 3.866
Interest in politics −0.923 0.923 .331 0.398 0.057 2.770 0.028 5.697
Trust in political parties −0.641 0.749 .399 0.527 0.114 2.437 0.067 4.154
Offline political discussion 0.661 0.560 .239 1.937 0.641 5.853 0.450 8.336
Gender (male) −0.227 0.298 .449 0.797 0.440 1.444 0.362 1.755
Age −1.051 0.992 .303 0.350 0.044 2.792 0.020 5.987
Education 1.025 0.714 .156 2.787 0.670 11.599 0.419 18.522
Income 1.421 0.797 .086 4.141 0.804 21.324 0.452 37.950
Constant −3.087 0.945 .003 0.046 0.007 0.317 0.003 0.625
N 727  
Nagelkerke R2 .125  
Log-likelihood 518.951  
Percentage correctly predicted 86.5  
Note. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages 
exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
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Appendix G. German Respondents—Dependent Variable: Engagement With Mixed Political Networks on Social Media.
B SE p exp(B) 95% CI for exp(B) 99% CI for exp(B)
 min max min max
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive 0.832 0.554 .140 2.297 0.755 6.988 0.521 10.127
Oppositional 1.200 0.553 .031 3.320 1.115 9.879 0.788 13.986
Mixed 1.696 0.615 .007 5.452 1.606 18.513 1.080 27.531
Ratio of political messages on the 
total exchanged on social media
0.149 0.095 .126 1.160 0.957 1.406 0.898 1.500
Preferred use of social media 0.224 0.777 .775 1.251 0.260 6.021 0.153 10.246
Source of political information
Internet −0.386 0.845 .648 0.680 0.130 3.568 0.077 6.016
Newspapers −0.167 0.602 .782 0.846 0.259 2.764 0.178 4.021
Radio 0.562 0.589 .343 1.755 0.542 5.685 0.368 8.364
Television −0.008 0.658 .990 0.992 0.263 3.748 0.167 5.876
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” −0.581 0.767 .450 0.559 0.122 2.554 0.075 4.168
“Public officials don’t care” 0.849 0.799 .290 2.338 0.480 11.385 0.288 18.959
“Politics is too complicated” 0.799 0.740 .285 2.223 0.506 9.756 0.311 15.876
Interest in politics 0.846 1.167 .469 2.331 0.235 23.107 0.114 47.729
Trust in political parties 0.597 0.912 .517 1.817 0.283 11.667 0.149 22.162
Offline political discussion −0.118 0.800 .883 0.889 0.184 4.304 0.111 7.113
Gender (male) 0.367 0.458 .427 1.444 0.575 3.626 0.422 4.936
Age −0.401 1.050 .703 0.670 0.083 5.431 0.042 10.784
Education −1.042 0.905 .252 0.353 0.059 2.124 0.033 3.792
Income 0.812 0.895 .366 2.253 0.382 13.292 0.215 23.578
Constant −5.569 1.221 .000 0.004 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.093
N 727  
Nagelkerke R2 .141  
Log-likelihood 312.860  
Percentage correctly predicted 93.4  
Note. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages 
exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
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Appendix H. Italian Respondents—Dependent Variable: Engagement With Supportive Political Networks on Social Media.
B SE p exp(B) 95% CI for exp(B) 99% CI for exp(B)
 min max Min max
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive 0.998 0.167 .000 2.714 1.956 3.766 1.764 4.175
Oppositional 0.040 0.192 .836 1.040 0.713 1.517 0.633 1.710
Mixed 0.032 0.271 .905 1.033 0.607 1.757 0.513 2.078
Ratio of political messages on the 
total exchanged on social media
0.120 0.038 .003 1.128 1.044 1.217 1.019 1.248
Preferred use of social media 1.714 0.355 .000 5.550 2.763 11.147 2.217 13.893
Source of political information
Internet 0.171 0.417 .682 1.187 0.519 2.716 0.397 3.550
Newspapers −0.690 0.278 .014 0.501 0.289 0.868 0.243 1.036
Radio −0.508 0.230 .028 0.601 0.382 0.946 0.331 1.092
Television 0.078 0.258 .762 1.081 0.652 1.792 0.557 2.100
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” 0.042 0.231 .855 1.043 .663 1.640 0.575 1.890
“Public officials don’t care” 0.338 0.262 .197 1.402 0.839 2.343 0.714 2.753
“Politics is too complicated” −0.098 0.202 .626 0.906 0.610 1.346 0.539 1.524
Interest in politics −0.141 0.458 .759 0.868 0.347 2.170 0.257 2.934
Trust in political parties 0.379 0.301 .209 1.461 0.808 2.639 0.671 3.180
Offline political discussion 0.257 0.536 .632 1.293 0.452 3.696 0.325 5.142
Gender (male) −0.211 0.149 .158 0.810 0.605 1.085 0.551 1.190
Age −0.561 0.438 .201 0.570 0.240 1.353 0.183 1.782
Education 0.361 0.492 .463 1.435 0.546 3.773 0.402 5.123
Income −0.094 0.314 .766 0.910 0.485 1.708 0.394 2.104
Constant −1.348 0.506 .008 0.260 0.096 0.700 0.071 0.955
N 1,167  
Nagelkerke R2 .164  
Log-likelihood 1,391.319  
Percentage correctly predicted 68.7  
Note. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages 
exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
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Appendix I. Italian Respondents—Dependent Variable: Engagement With Oppositional Political Networks on Social Media.
B SE p exp(B) 95% CI for exp(B) 99% CI for exp(B)
 min max Min max
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive 0.183 0.296 .538 1.201 0.668 2.157 0.554 2.604
Oppositional 1.756 0.251 .000 5.788 3.532 9.485 3.020 11.094
Mixed 1.082 0.348 .002 2.950 1.489 5.846 1.200 7.254
Ratio of political messages on the 
total exchanged on social media
−0.058 0.046 .211 0.944 0.862 1.033 0.838 1.063
Preferred use of social media −1.056 0.462 .022 0.348 0.141 0.861 0.106 1.146
Source of political information
Internet −0.488 0.509 .339 0.614 0.225 1.675 0.163 2.307
Newspapers 0.060 0.369 .872 1.062 0.512 2.200 0.406 2.779
Radio 0.005 0.308 .987 1.005 0.549 1.839 0.454 2.227
Television −0.068 0.359 .850 0.934 0.460 1.897 0.367 2.376
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” 0.469 0.311 .132 1.598 0.868 2.942 0.716 3.568
“Public officials don’t care” −0.239 0.395 .546 0.787 0.360 1.723 0.279 2.219
“Politics is too complicated” 0.000 0.266 1.000 1.000 0.594 1.683 0.504 1.982
Interest in politics 0.805 0.556 .148 2.238 0.751 6.671 0.531 9.422
Trust in political parties −0.386 0.412 .349 0.680 0.303 1.526 0.235 1.970
Offline political discussion −1.014 0.692 .144 0.363 0.093 1.413 0.061 2.170
Gender (male) 0.041 0.201 .838 1.042 0.703 1.546 0.621 1.750
Age −0.347 0.552 .530 0.707 0.239 2.086 0.170 2.931
Education 0.290 0.617 .639 1.336 0.398 4.480 0.272 6.552
Income 0.227 0.368 .537 1.255 0.610 2.586 0.485 3.247
Constant −1.893 0.660 .004 0.151 0.041 0.549 0.027 0.825
N 1,167  
Nagelkerke R2 .157  
Log-likelihood 889.100  
Percentage correctly predicted 85.1  
Note. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages 
exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
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Appendix J. Italian Respondents—Dependent Variable: Engagement With Mixed Political Networks on Social Media.
B SE p exp(B) 95% CI for exp(B) 99% CI for exp(B)
 min max Min max
Face-to-face political networks (ref. neutral)
Supportive 0.580 0.391 .140 1.786 0.825 3.866 0.644 4.950
Oppositional 0.228 0.404 .572 1.256 0.569 2.775 0.443 3.562
Mixed 2.072 0.446 .000 7.942 3.274 19.268 2.456 25.690
Ratio of political messages on the 
total exchanged on social media
0.126 0.066 .055 1.135 0.997 1.291 0.957 1.345
Preferred use of social media −0.675 0.680 .322 0.509 0.134 1.940 0.088 2.965
Source of political information
Internet −0.983 0.748 .189 0.374 0.086 1.621 0.054 2.570
Newspapers −0.433 0.521 .408 0.648 0.231 1.823 0.165 2.545
Radio 0.815 0.449 .070 2.259 0.936 5.452 0.709 7.194
Television 0.911 0.578 .117 2.487 0.793 7.794 0.550 11.249
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” −0.048 0.427 .911 0.953 0.412 2.204 0.317 2.868
“Public officials don’t care” −0.886 0.543 .103 0.412 0.142 1.198 0.101 1.678
“Politics is too complicated” 0.311 0.393 .429 1.365 0.631 2.952 0.495 3.766
Interest in politics 1.969 1.059 .074 7.164 0.811 63.246 0.376 136.337
Trust in political parties −0.768 0.605 .205 0.464 0.142 1.521 0.097 2.212
Offline political discussion −0.587 1.384 .675 0.556 0.033 9.400 0.012 25.078
Gender (male) 0.212 0.287 .460 1.236 0.705 2.168 0.590 2.588
Age −0.798 0.833 .340 0.450 0.087 2.334 0.051 3.957
Education 0.614 0.964 .525 1.848 0.275 12.431 0.149 22.930
Income −0.528 0.571 .357 0.590 0.190 1.827 0.132 2.633
Constant −4.822 1.210 .000 0.008 0.001 0.089 0.000 0.195
N 1,167  
Nagelkerke R2 .143  
Log-likelihood 503.732  
Percentage correctly predicted 93.4  
Note. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from political messages 
exchanged (0-10) and preferred use of social media (−1 to 1).
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Appendix K. Question Wording, Response Modes, and Descriptive Statistics for All Control Variables Included in the Models.
Question wording Response modes Variablea
Overall, how important are social media 
to you personally when it comes to finding 
other people who share your views about 
important political issues?
Overall, how important are social media 
to you personally when it comes to finding 
other people who do not share your views 
about important political issues?
Very important, somehow important, not 
too important, not at all important, (don’t 
know)
Very important, somehow important, not 
too important, not at all important, (don’t 
know)
“Preferred use of social media”b
Italian data set
M = .017, SD = .201
German data set
M = .039, SD = .240
Generally speaking, how much are you 
interested in politics?
Very interested, moderately interested, 
slightly interested, not interested at all, 
(don’t know)
“Interest in politics”
Italian data set
M = .773, SD = .227
German data set
M = .791, SD = .242
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with each of these statements?
People like me don’t have any say about 
what the government does.
Definitely not true, not really true, quite 
true, definitely true, (don’t know)
“People don’t have any say” 
(disagreement with)
Italian data set
M = .483, SD = .316
German data set
M = .540, SD = .279
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with each of these statements?
Public officials care what people like me 
think.
Definitely not true, not really true, quite 
true, definitely true, (don’t know)
“Public officials don’t care”
(disagreement with)
Italian data set
M = .341, SD = .288
German data set
M = .416, SD = .268
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with each of these statements?
Sometimes, politics and government seem 
so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on,
Definitely not true, not really true, quite 
true, definitely true, (don’t know)
“Politics is too complicated”
(disagreement with)
Italian data set
M = .536, SD = .346
German data set
M = .622, SD = .297
How much do you trust the following 
institutions and organizations? Political 
parties.
A lot, a fair amount, a little, not at all, 
(don’t know)
“Trust in political parties”
Italian data set
M = .242, SD = .255
German data set
M = .386, SD = .246
How often do you talk about politics with 
your friends, family, and acquaintances?
Every day or almost every day, a few times 
a week, a few times a month, never or 
almost never, (don’t know)
“Offline political discussion (frequency)”
Italian data set
M = .880, SD = .179
German data set
M = .657, SD = .316
How often do you turn to each of the 
following media outlets for getting political 
news of your interest? Internet.
Never, at least once a month, at least once 
a week, every day, more than once per day, 
(don’t know)
“Source of political information: Internet”
Italian data set
M = .843, SD = .210
German data set
M = .789, SD = .275
How often do you turn to each of the 
following media outlets for getting political 
news of your interest? Newspapers.
Never, at least once a month, at least once 
a week, every day, more than once per day, 
(don’t know)
“Source of political information: 
Newspapers”
Italian data set
M = .410, SD = .295
German data set
M = .338, SD = .307
How often do you turn to each of the 
following media outlets for getting political 
news of your interest? Radio.
Never, at least once a month, at least once 
a week, every day, more than once per day, 
(don’t know)
“Source of political information: Radio”
Italian data set
M = .528, SD = .325
German data set
M = .496, SD = .357
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Question wording Response modes Variablea
How often do you turn to each of the 
following media outlets for getting political 
news of your interest? Television.
Never, at least once a month, at least once 
a week, every day, more than once per day, 
(don’t know)
“Source of political information: 
Television”
Italian data set
M = .633, SD = .278
German data set
M = .488, SD = .328
Are you . . . Male, female “Gender (male)”
Italian data set
Male 56,6% of respondents
German data set
Male 65,4% of respondents
What year were you born in? [Italian data 
set]
How old are you? [German data set]
[Open answer]
Italian data set
(Youngest resp. aged 13, oldest 76)
German data set
(Youngest resp. aged 13, oldest 72)
“Age”
Italian data set
M = .308, SD = .182
German data set
M = .351, SD = .207
What best describes your final level of 
education?
None, primary school, secondary school 
degree, vocational school degree, high 
school degree, undergraduate degree, 
postgraduate degree, doctoral degree 
[Italian data set]
None, primary school, secondary school 
(Hauptschule), high school (Abitur), 
undergraduate degree, postgraduate 
degree, doctoral degree [German data set]
“Education”
Italian data set
M = .636, SD = .153
German data set
M = .622, SD = .214
What is the gross annual income, before 
tax or other deductions, for you and your 
family? [Italian data set]
What is the gross monthly income, before 
tax or other deductions, for you and your 
family? [German data set]
Less than 6,000 euro; between 6,000 and 
12,000 euro; between 12,000 and 18,000 
euro; between 18,000 and 24,000 euro; 
between 24,000 and 30,000 euro; between 
30,000 and 36,000 euro; between 36,000 
and 42,000 euro; between 42,000 and 
50,000 euro; between 50,000 and 75,000 
euro; more than 100,000 euro. [Italian data 
set]
Less than 500 euro; between 500 and 
900 euro; between 900 and 1,300 euro; 
between 1,300 and 1,500 euro; between 
1,500 and 2,000 euro; between 2,000 and 
2,600 euro; between 2,600 and 3,500 euro; 
between 3,500 and 4,500 euro; between 
4,500 and 6,000 euro; between 6,000 and 
8,000 euro; more than 8,000 euro [German 
data set]
“Income”c
Italian data set
M = .463, SD = .250
German data set
M = .455, SD = .231
a All control variables included in our models range from 0 to 1 apart from preferred use of social media (–1 to 1). Descriptive statistics presented in the 
table refer to these variables (weighted as described in Appendix B).
b This variable was built based on responses to the two questions, which we combined by subtracting the values of the second from those of the first, 
so that respondents who claimed that agreement was more important than disagreement would have positive values, whereas those who stated 
that disagreement was more important than agreement would have negative values, and those who attributed equal importance to agreement and 
disagreement would have a score of zero.
c Because our income variable included a large proportion of missing data we mean-replaced these missing values and added a dummy variable to the 
analysis to identify these cases (further explanations of the method and implications are in Note 18 in the article).
Appendix K. (Continued)
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Appendix L. Dependent Variable(s): Types of Political Networks Respondents Engage With on Social Media (Variable Measuring 
Preference for Encountering Agreeing vs. Disagreeing Viewpoints on Social Media Excluded From Models).
Germany Italy
 Supportive Oppositional Mixed Supportive Oppositional Mixed
Face-to-face political networks (ref. Neutral)
Supportive 0.890*** (0.223) −0.262 (0.351) 0.831 (0.545) 1.040*** (0.165) 0.198 (0.292) 0.681 (0.384)
Oppositional −0.355 (0.283) 1.027*** (0.312) 1.286* (0.563) 0.087 (0.193) 1.751*** (0.247) 0.243 (0.404)
Mixed −0.280 (0.368) 0.392 (0.526) 1.720** (0.607) 0.079 (0.266) 1.075** (0.345) 2.094*** (0.438)
Ratio of political messages 
on the total exchanged on 
social media
0.133** (0.042) −0.038 (0.064) 0.168 (0.095) 0.131*** (0.037) −0.064 (0.045) 0.097 (0.065)
Source of political information
Internet 0.126 (0.449) 0.837 (0.598) −0.311 (0.826) 0.152 (0.408) −0.480 (0.504) −0.882 (0.739)
Newspapers −0.522 (0.310) 0.297 (0.419) −0.039 (0.589) −0.728** (0.267) 0.049 (0.355) −0.438 (0.503)
Radio −0.829** (0.273) 0.549 (0.428) 0.477 (0.565) −0.534* (0.221) −0.006 (0.302) 0.714 (0.435)
Television −0.391 (0.303) −0.216 (0.458) 0.088 (0.656) 0.117 (0.253) −0.014 (0.351) 0.854 (0.567)
Political efficacy (disagreement with following sentences)
“People don’t have any say” 0.185 (0.426) −0.148 (0.546) −0.430 (0.728) 0.079 (0.228) 0.441 (0.308) −0.164 (0.421)
“Public officials don’t care” −0.130 (0.415) −0.134 (0.608) 0.748 (0.773) 0.340 (0.258) −0.236 (0.393) −0.852 (0.531)
“Politics is too 
complicated”
−0.456 (0.329) −0.001 (0.503) 0.842 (0.748) −0.048 (0.197) −0.005 (0.262) 0.264 (0.379)
Interest in politics 1.412** (0.502) −0.644 (0.831) 0.784 (1.105) −0.288 (0.444) 0.912 (0.551) 2.272* (1.058)
Trust in political parties 0.084 (0.494) −0.955 (0.721) 0.534 (0.863) 0.451 (0.298) −0.445 (0.405) −0.601 (0.585)
Offline political discussion −0.002 (0.368) 0.758 (0.515) −0.112 (0.777) 0.421 (0.526) −1.095 (0.675) −0.523 (1.359)
Gender (male) −0.105 (0.202) −0.143 (0.289) 0.378 (0.460) −0.203 (0.146) 0.029 (0.199) 0.216 (0.282)
Age −0.674 (0.533) −0.925 (0.891) −0.388 (1.017) −0.487 (0.427) −0.381 (0.548) −0.890 (0.815)
Education −0.434 (0.495) 0.838 (0.685) −1.089 (0.896) 0.377 (0.486) 0.129 (0.613) 0.555 (0.941)
Income −0.558 (0.422) 1.159 (0.746) 0.822 (0.849) −0.094 (0.307) 0.241 (0.359) −0.381 (0.552)
Constant −0.673 (0.478) −3.179*** (0.879) −5.799*** (1.166) −1.512** (0.499) −1.776** (0.646) −4.948*** (1.194)
N 776 776 776 1,193 1,193 1,193
Nagelkerke R2 .205 .113 .145 .137 .148 .138
Log-likelihood 914.299 549.283 323.175 1,439.763 907.024 525.302
Note. Cell entries are log odds, SE in parentheses. Dummy variable identifying missing observations for income omitted from table. All variables range from 0 to 1 apart from 
political messages exchanged (0-10).
***p⩽ .001. **p ⩽ .01. *p⩽ .05.
Appendix M. Bivariate Relationship Between Online and Offline Networks of Political Discussion, Germany.
Offline networks N
 Supportive Mixed Oppositional Neutral
Online networks Supportive 56.4% 33.1% 32.9% 29.6% 369
 Mixed 6.8% 15.8% 8.8% 3%  60
 Oppositional 8.3% 13% 23.8% 11.6% 114
 Neutral 28.5% 38.1% 34.5% 55.8% 366
 N 345 79 154 331 909
Appendix N. Bivariate Relationship Between Online and Offline Networks of Political Discussion, Italy.
Offline networks N
 Supportive Mixed Oppositional Neutral
Online networks Supportive 52.4% 29% 27.9% 25.5% 478
 Mixed 7.4% 20.9% 6.1% 4.3% 97
 Oppositional 9.1% 19.7% 32.1% 8% 207
 Neutral 31.1% 30.4% 33.9% 62.2% 556
 N 465 112 340 421 1,338
